MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

PROGRAMME DOCUMENT

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT STABILISATION PROGRAMME FOR THE WIDER HORN OF AFRICA/EAST AFRICA 2011-2014
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Abbreviations

AMISOM  African Union Military Mission on Somalia
APP     Africa Programme for Peace (Danida)
APSA    African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF     African Stand-by Force
AU      African Union
CEO     Contingent Owned Equipment
CGPCS   Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
DAC     Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
CD     Defence Command, Denmark
DFID    Department for International Development (UK)
DKK     Danish Kroner (currency)
DSF     Danish Stabilisation Fund
EAC     East African Community
EASF    Eastern Africa Stand-By Force
EASFCOM EASF Coordination Mechanism
EU      European Union
FOC     Full Operating Capability
HQ      Headquarters
ICPAT   IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism
IGAD   Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPSTC  International Peace Support Training Centre
IPSS   IGAD Peace and Security Strategy
JPLG   Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
MFA    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD    Ministry of Defence
MoJ    Ministry of Justice
NACS   Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
ODA    Official Development Assistance
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PSF    Peace and Stabilisation Fund
PSO    Peace Support Operation
PSOD   Peace Support Operations Division (AU)
RDC    Rapid Deployment Capability
REC    Regional Economic Community
RM     Regional Mechanism
ROI    Regions of Origin Initiative
SOP    Standard Operating Procedures
TFG    Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TFI    Transitional Federal Institutions (Somalia)
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UN  United Nations
UNAMID  African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOA  United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNPOS  United Nations Political Office for Somalia
WGSS  Whole of Government Stabilisation Secretariat
WG2  Working Group 2 on Legal Issues of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
1 Introduction

The costs of conflict and instability are high for both local and national communities as well as the international community. The need for an approach in fragile states, which integrates and coordinates immediate and long term stabilisation efforts with long term development is crucial, to ensure maximum impact and sustainability.

Denmark has established a new framework for implementing a Whole-of-Government approach to stabilisation, which includes security and justice sector development as well as peace-building in fragile states. The framework seeks to deepen integration between the areas of diplomacy, defence and development in order to enhance the impact of Danish stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. It emphasises the priorities of the Danish government to enhance sustainable stabilisation efforts based on local ownership and capacity building.

Funding for such initiatives is provided through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, which combines Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA financing, reflecting that a mix is needed for successful stabilisation efforts. With emphasis on two regional priority areas, the Danish Peace- and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) focuses its efforts on the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa and the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.

In line with the overall objectives for the Danish stabilisation effort, this Programme Document describes a coherent regional programme for the period 2011-2014 in the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa region (in short Wider Horn of Africa) to be financed through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund. The programme consists of three components related to stabilisation of the region:

- **Component 1** supports **regional efforts in stabilisation and peace-building capacity**, including support to the building of regional capacity under the auspices of the African Union’s mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and support to the Eastern Africa Standby Forces (EASF), specifically the section based in Rwanda;

- **Component 2** supports the joint efforts of **preventing and countering piracy** as well as **stabilisation of Somalia**, including support to the CGPCS Working Group 2 on legal issues of piracy, support for regional maritime capacity building and security sector reform in Somalia through UN programmes;

- **Component 3** focuses on **prevention of support to terrorism, radicalisation and money laundering**;

- A **reserve pool of unallocated funds** is available for emerging conflicts or situations and thus allows for flexibility in the efforts to strengthen stabilisation of the region.

The Programme is the product of several cross-departmental missions, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish Defence Command, undertaken in
2011. The missions conducted consultations with a broad range of actors, including UN agencies, the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), government representatives, embassies, military and stabilisation experts, other donors, civil society representatives as well as think-tank representatives. Interviews with stakeholders and experts took place in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Mombasa as well as in Somaliland and Puntland.

Programme rationale
The Wider Horn of Africa region has seen modest progress in terms of peace and security in the past decade, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan being a case in point. Also, political and economic integration furthered by the African Union and its regional counterparts is contributing to strengthening dialogue, peace and stability. The efforts being led by the African Union, with support from the region, to resolve the Somalia conflict illustrate this commitment.

Even though there has been a positive development in democratic governance in a number of countries in the region e.g. Kenya and Tanzania, the regional dynamics in the Wider Horn are complex and countries, such as Somalia, the Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan, are all affected by violent conflict and political instability. The stresses on society in parts of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia are being exacerbated through the current drought. New threats have also emerged and expanded over the past decade. The effects of these challenges are seen in refugee flows and trafficking of persons and commodities (not least arms and drugs across the Red Sea between Yemen and the African Horn). The lack of adequate governance in parts of the region also has wider implications in terms of threats to international security from piracy, smuggling, money laundering, and the harbouring of militant groups with links to international terrorism.

Somalia is in many ways an epicentre for the region’s overall fragility. Its violent conflict has had major political, security, development, and humanitarian consequences that stretch beyond its borders. This provides an important part of the rationale for this programme’s focus on Somalia and the region. Through the 2010 terrorist attacks in Kampala, as well as attacks in Nairobi in October of 2011, the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab has demonstrated its ability to operate beyond Somalia’s borders. The group is also known to be actively recruiting from amongst disenchanted youth in Kenya’s coastal region and is reportedly partly financed through the proceeds from piracy. The lack of governance and absence of rule of law is allowing piracy to flourish, which in turn threatens international shipping and trade as well as economic development. Helped by porous borders and inadequate financial controls, the proceeds from piracy and other forms of organised and transnational crime have negative and destabilising implications, not just in Somalia, but also in neighbouring countries.

The rationale behind the programme is to contribute to the building of African countries’ own capacity to address stabilisation, as well as support for stabilisation efforts in Somalia through multilateral partners. The programme will support efforts in areas of strategic importance, including strengthened regional capacity, conflict prevention, peace keeping, counter piracy, and counter terrorism, in order to ensure the long term goal of supporting a peaceful and
stabile Somalia - this being in the interest both regionally and internationally, including for Denmark.

Addressing these challenges requires a long term, multifaceted, integrated and regional approach that takes account of the context (opportunities as well as challenges) and makes use of the various instruments that can be applied in fragile situations. It is essential to recognise the risks involved – but also the consequences of not acting - and include a whole-of-government approach in addition to the more traditional instruments of humanitarian aid and development assistance. Key lessons from the growing experience from operating in such complex environments include the need to address prevention, prioritise state building, identify and align with local priorities (recognising that these may be different in different contexts) and stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.¹

Within the scope of this programme, there is a need to be realistic about what can be achieved (and how quickly) in view of the resources that are available, including those of the Danish embassies in the region. Likewise, there is a need to be realistic about the speed at which results can be achieved. While some results can be expected within the lifetime of this programme, others will not necessarily be apparent. These factors are recognised in the recent Danish Policy on Fragile States. Likewise, the regional scope of the programme has had to reconcile the two competing demands for focus and coverage. This has been done by identifying a limited number of interventions which together have regional and international scope. In this way, the efforts are focused yet add value at a regional level to stabilisation efforts.

In practice, this means that the programme thus:

- Has a focus on building and enhancing the capacity of the region to respond to crises and contribute to peace support operations. The region can already be said to be partly doing this through the AU mission in Somalia (where Uganda and Burundi are troop contributors and where a further regional enhancement at headquarters level from other countries is on its way). The programme will support these immediate efforts and also contribute to enhancing regional peace support capacity for the medium to long term.

- Has a focus on Somalia - given its key role in the region as a source of instability. The programme complements the Danish Somalia programme. Using the mix of ODA and non-ODA funding available, it supports regional and multilateral efforts to stabilise Somalia and counter piracy on land and at sea. At the same time, the programme will support the AU mission in Somalia that is currently extending the areas under control of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. The combined effects of these inputs will contribute to increased stability in Somalia and thus reduce the negative effects of the crisis on the rest of the region.

- Will address issues of regional and international strategic importance, inter alia, the countering of piracy and stabilisation of Somalia (conflict prevention, peace keeping,

¹ See OECD/DAC’s Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations
counter terrorism and radicalisation, anti-money laundering, rule of law and human rights) which is also in the long term interest of Denmark. Bearing in mind that the Danish interventions are limited seen in an international perspective, focusing the limited resources available geographically, thematically, and within a coordinated and regional framework, the programme seeks to contribute to the overall international goal: stability in the region.

2 National and Regional Context

Regional Dynamics

The regional dynamics are complex, highly politicised and influenced by various levels of violent conflict and political instability. Competing political interests are seen at regional, national and local levels. This is most obvious over the future of Somalia where Ethiopia and Kenya (and now also Burundi and Uganda due to their peace support contributions) as well as the various regions of Somalia have direct interests. Porous borders, humanitarian challenges, extreme poverty, mediocre rule of law and access to justice, widespread corruption, the marginalisation of women, coupled with gender based violence, and the presence of violent opposition groups in several countries in the region contribute to low levels of human security.

Somalia represents an extreme case, but many other countries in the region also have areas where the reach of government is limited. The destabilising effects of the situation in Somalia are also seen in parts of Kenya and Ethiopia. Forces from both these countries have intervened in Al-Shabaab controlled areas across the border in Somalia. Ethiopia deployed troops to Somalia to support the transitional government between 2006–2009 while Eritrea supported Islamist movements against the transitional government and Ethiopia. Most recently Kenya also engaged in a military campaign on Somali territory.

Furthermore the severe famine within the region has considerably increased the vulnerability of the civilian population – resulting in instability in the entire region. The United Nations estimate that almost 13 million people are affected from the crisis and currently more than seven hundred thousand Somalis’ are at risk of dying. Six of the country’s regions have been officially declared famine areas by the UN, and observers indicate that the impact of the famine will be felt for years to come. The famine highlights the degree to which poor governance and criminal activities have made millions of marginalised people vulnerable, and the famine has created additional pressure on the fragile government structures.

Taken together, these factors imply that stabilisation efforts in the region (including from this programme) need to be considered from the perspective of their local, national, regional and international effects. For example, successful outcomes from enhanced rule of law efforts where these are possible in Somalia can improve the security of local communities, strengthen government legitimacy, reduce incidents of piracy and other forms of organised crime, and reduce the negative impacts of these on international trade and regional economies. A lesson

2 The Horn of Africa security complex by Beroak Mesfin and Unravelling the Islamist insurgency in Somalia by Matteo Guglielmo – both in Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa, ISS, 2011.
from other programmes, including the Danish Africa Programme for Peace, which supports regional approaches to peace and security, is that adequate local ownership and interest is essential if efforts are to be sustainable in the longer term.

**Regional responses**
The regional political and economic structures (the AU, IGAD and the East African Community (EAC)) have so far been unable to counteract the political and security challenges to a significant degree. However, they are engaged at the political and, in the case of the AU and the EASF, the military level, which also include civilian and police elements.

As the continental organisation with responsibility for peace and security, the AU is actively supporting stabilisation efforts in Somalia (mainly through its peace mission – AMISOM) and in parts of the Sudan (through the hybrid mission in Darfur – UNAMID). It has also been engaged at the political level, including through the High Level Panel on Darfur (the Mbeki Panel). In Somalia, the efforts have recently been strengthened through the engagement of former Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, as the AU’s High Representative for Somalia.

The AU peace operations remain heavily supported by the UN, the EU and bilateral donors in terms of financing, logistical support, and pre-mission training. The AU also wishes to play a role in post-conflict reconstruction but, while engaged at the political level (also through its liaison offices), the AU currently lacks the capacity and financing to make a real difference on the ground.

Since its inception, a major point of effort for the AU has been the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture that aims to strengthen African capacities in the areas of political decision-making, early warning, peace support, and mediation.³ Denmark has actively supported this through the Africa Programme for Peace and the Nordic countries have been supporting military capacity building of the Eastern African Standby Forces since 2009. The Africa Programme for Peace represents an important opportunity to create synergies with the present programme – for example support to the AU’s post-conflict reconstruction agenda.

Likewise, IGAD is generally regarded as playing an important political role with ambitions to strengthen development in the wider Horn of Africa. Despite the fact that its implementation capacity is limited and competing interests amongst member states - at times - hamper its political decision-making, the organisation plays an important role in the region. IGAD made a significant contribution to the Peace Agreement in Sudan in 2005, alongside Kenya, and it has attempted to do likewise in relation to Somalia. The present transitional arrangements, for example, arose out of the IGAD-sponsored Djibouti peace process and there has been an effort to link the IGAD, AU and UN positions on Somalia. The general consensus is that it is important to include IGAD in the political processes concerning Somalia, although its efforts

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³ The recent assessment of the APSA noted that while progress is being made, there is a need for greater strategic guidance from the AU, improved staffing levels in the Commission, and better coordination and coherence within the Commission and with the regional mechanisms. *African Peace and Security Architecture: 2010 Assessment Study, African Union.*
on the ground are limited. IGAD’s support to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia is partly being taken forward through its Strategic Plan on Re-establishing Effective Institutions in Somalia and through an IGAD Office and facilitator for Somalia. IGAD is part of the International Monitoring Group on Somalia and its technical committee in Mogadishu.

Denmark has supported IGAD’s involvement in regional peace and security as a reflection of its mandate and regional membership, which is seen as important. The Africa Programme for Peace helped finance the development of IGAD’s Peace and Security Strategy which is a comprehensive document. Results have been achieved in the areas of early warning and counter-terrorism capacity building (also supported by Denmark). Financial support was also provided in 2010 to IGAD’s Strategic Plan for Somalia.

All countries in IGAD – plus Burundi, Rwanda, Comoros, The Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius, Eritrea, and Tanzania - are also members of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), which is the regional peacekeeping capability now being developed. The EASF has strong regional ownership and was established in accordance with Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, adopted by the Heads of State and Government in July 2002. The EASF is making progress towards its goal of achieving full operating capability by 2015, in line with the AU Road Map for the African Standby Force. It has so far concentrated primarily on developing its multinational command structure and its land component with its multinational Headquarters. EASF’s force structure (national forces) will include a number of rapid deployment capabilities and military formations, as well as civilian and police elements. Initial work has started to lay the foundations for a maritime capability (which is relevant given current experiences from the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia).

Two members of EASF (Burundi and Uganda) are already contributing troops to the mission in Somalia, and other countries are in principle willing to do so. EASF being one of the AU’s five regions has recently concluded a MOU with the AU allowing EASF to deploy elements into the Somalia mission. EASF is the first ASF institution which will engage actively in an ongoing mission – initially with a small staff element but with perspective of more active engagement including troop contributions from EASF member states, where EASF may be given a coordinating and mounting headquarters role – including a resource and donor mobilisation role. Elsewhere, Rwanda has been a committed troop contributor to the AU mission in Darfur. Ethiopia and Kenya also have longstanding records of UN peacekeeping service. Recently, Ethiopia decided to provide the main part of the troops to the new UN peacekeeping operation in Abyei, Sudan.

The regional organisations have all acknowledged the importance of responding to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (which, inter alia, seeks to increase the participation of women in decision-making relating to peace efforts). However, the impact of this at the political level has largely not been felt and the main inputs continue to come from civil society based women’s groups working at the community level.

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4 Madagascar, Mauritius, Eritrea and Tanzania are currently not full active members of EASF.
Somalia
The violent conflict in much of Somalia over the last twenty years has major political, security, humanitarian, and development consequences. The lack of governance and absence of rule of law is allowing piracy to flourish, which in turn threatens international shipping and trade as well as economic development. The unstable environment also produces refugee flows and internal displacement, and provides room for militant groups with links to international terrorism. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has so far had difficulty establishing itself as a legitimate authority – and has until very recently only controlled a part of the capital, Mogadishu. It is supported by the UN-mandated peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) that is currently extending its operational sphere into areas previously controlled by the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab. As it does so, there will be a need to support efforts to consolidate the mission’s presence (through adjustments to its capacity in terms of numbers and maritime and engineer capabilities) and extend the transitional government’s ability to provide basic services (including law and order).

The political and security situation in Somalia has developed dramatically over the past year, and is characterized by both positive and negative developments. The positive developments are marked by the fact that the political and military context in South Central Somalia has changed considerably. Most prominent has been the revitalization of the political process, aimed at ending the political transition through the Mogadishu Road Map, as well as the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from its positions around Mogadishu. The withdrawal of Al-Shabaab – although in itself a positive development – has also resulted in a more volatile and unpredictable security situation, and the humanitarian crisis as a result of the ongoing drought has a destabilising effect on the entire region.

The signing of the Kampala Accord on 9 June 2011 paved the way for the formation of a new government – extending its term until August 2012 in order to provide space to develop a new constitution and improve the delivery of services - and the drafting of the Road Map on ending the transition which was adopted on 6 September 2011 in a consultative meeting in Mogadishu. The Mogadishu Road Map is an ambitious document, and the fact that regional entities (Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunnna Wal Jamma) for the first time have signed up to the plan leaves hope for a successful transition – although the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) still have to prove that they are able to deliver.

The positive political developments have been paralleled by an improved security situation in Mogadishu, although it is still volatile and fluid. Al-Shabaab appears to have been weakened considerably, splintering into a number of factions. In areas outside the capital, forces allied to the TFG, most particularly Ahlu Sunnna Wal Jamma have made significant gains. Recently the Kenyan Army launched a military campaign in the southern part of Somalia. This has put Al-Shabaab under considerable pressure and opened up new opportunities for the TFG to expand the territory under its control.

However, these developments also pose significant risks if the TFG and AMISOM are unable to consolidate these gains. The TFG suggest that Al-Shabaab is regrouping and that fighters have dispersed, including to Puntland and Somaliland in the northern half of the country. The
military intervention by Kenya also raises the potential risks of terrorist attacks on Kenyan territory. Finally the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab has placed new strains on AMISOM to respond to the unfolding military developments. AMISOM is stretched more thinly on the ground and the military situation has shifted from one where the front line was relatively clear to one in which Al-Shabaab will resort to asymmetric warfare and insurgency tactics, both inside and outside Somalia.

The political and security situation in Somaliland is relatively stable. There was a change of government and president in June-July 2010 through a peaceful and well-conducted election. Somaliland is much more accessible than South Central Somalia and a number of development activities are underway, including rule-of-law and access-to-justice programmes. Lagging somewhat behind its neighbour, the Puntland government is preparing to hold an election and is going through a constitutional process. The security situation is mixed; some of the pirate cartels have their base in Puntland, and piracy constitutes a considerable challenge for the Puntland authorities. Somaliland and Puntland share a common border, which is disputed and is a cause of tension. Likewise, the possible existence of substantial untapped oil reserves in Puntland is a potential source of tension given the unclear relationship between the region and the rest of Somalia. Politically, Puntland has recently been distancing itself from the rest of Somalia and, in particular, from the Transitional Federal Government. In January 2011, the authorities issued a statement declaring that they no longer recognized the authority of the federal government in international settings.

These developments set the overall context for the programme, and taking these developments into account, the programme focuses on conflict prevention, peace-building, peacekeeping and capacity building to strengthen the ability of regional actors to respond to current and future security challenges.

3 Previous and existing Danish support

Danish policy basis
The Danish government has in recent years formulated policies, which are the foundation for this programme, specifically:

- The Danish development strategy “Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change” (2010)
- Denmark’s Policy on Fragile States (2010)

5 http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Pirateristrategi_2011_ENG_WEB.ashx

Synergy with existing Danish programmes
There are already a number of Danish programmes directly and indirectly supporting peace and security (including stabilisation) efforts in the region. The design of the Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme takes these programmes into account and serves to increase the coherence of the overall effort:

- The Somalia Programme, which is a vehicle to implement the Danish policy for Somalia. The Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme relates to the Somalia strategy’s second pillar with the objective to “Promote stability and security locally, regionally and internationally.” It also contributes to the first pillar, which is “active diplomacy”. The other pillars, namely Governance, Growth and Employment, and Improved Living Conditions (Pillars 3, 4 and 5) are the focus of the Somalia Programme, which has an overall budget of approx. DKK 600 million over four years (2011-14). The overall objective of the programme is to contribute to the development of a Somalia capable of ensuring security and of promoting economic and social development.

- The Africa Programme for Peace (APP), which since 2004 has supported the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture at the overall level through capacity building of the African Union and the African regional organisations, including IGAD and the EASF Coordination Mechanism, as well as support for their activities. In connection with the Whole of Government Stabilisation Programme, the Africa Programme’s support for the African Union and its counterparts can be seen as helping to set the framework for these organisation’s contributions in the region.

- The Danish Development Programmes, which among others include the Governance Support Programme in Kenya (2010-15) which supports the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance in Kenya through indigenous civil society organisations.

- The Defence cooperation agreements within the Nordic framework, notably the Nordic Defence Cooperation and, within this, the African Capacity Building Perspective Plan (2010-2015). The latter identifies areas where the Nordic cooperation will focus its effort; in particular in relation to the development of the African Standby Force land component (including rapid deployment capabilities); peace support operations training; and development of a maritime component. The geographic focus of these efforts will be on Eastern Africa.

- Already existing projects under the Peace and Stabilisation Fund financed in 2010 include:
### Project/allocation Budget DKK M Purpose

1. Support for land component EASF 1.2 Support to EASF development, Rwanda risk analysis
2. Danish chairmanship of CGPCS Working Group 2 (WG2) on legal issues of piracy 1.0 Strengthened regional capacity to prosecute pirates
3. UNODC counter piracy programme on Seychelles 2.0 Strengthened legal capacity to prosecute pirates
4. Yemeni coastguard pilot project 7.2 Jetty feasibility study & various training inputs
5. Build-up of maritime capacities in East Africa/Horn of Africa 3.4 Various anti-piracy initiatives, incl. support to EASF Maritime Planning
6. Support to counter terrorism network 4.9 Strengthen national implementation Counter Terrorism legal basis
7. Support to countering financing of terrorism 5.0 Strengthening of Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Unit & analysis of Somali remittance systems
8. Support to Somali police & Puntland prison 10.0 Salary to Somali police & improvement of Gardo prison under UNDP
9. Contribution to AMISOM Trust Fund 10.0 Non-weapon related support to AMISOM troop contributing countries
10. Danish Defence Command allocation 5.0 Various

- **Other support.** This includes, for example, the support being provided outside of the Africa Programme for Peace to IGAD’s Strategic Plan on Re-establishing Effective Institutions in Somalia and through an IGAD Office and Facilitator for Somalia.

**Links to other International and Regional Policies and Programmes**

The Programme has aligned its intervention areas with policies and programmes in place or being developed by international and regional partners where appropriate, including:

a. The UN’s Integrated Framework for Somalia and UN’s Somalia Assistance Support  
b. The EU’s Somaliland and Somalia programmes (and a possible CSDP-mission)  
c. Activities initiated by the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, e.g. the system of post-trial transfers developed by WG2, which enables pirates to be prosecuted in one State and subsequently transferred to serve their sentences in UN-constructed prisons in Somalia (Puntland and Somaliland)  
d. AU, IGAD, EASF strategies relating to stand-by forces, maritime security etc.  
e. International anti-piracy operations: NATO-Operation Ocean Shield (with Danish participation) and EU-Atalanta (without Danish participation)
f. Nordic Defence Cooperation – account is taken of the Nordic Perspective Plan for African Capacity Building (is currently under review/updating)
g. Donor coordination (Friends of EASF, AU-partners, etc.).

Where relevant, these initiatives are reflected in the description of the components that follow.

4 Strategic approach to the Programme
The design of the present programme takes account of existing programmes and efforts as mentioned in the sections above, and serves to increase the coherence of the overall effort. In addition, it takes account of the Danish development programme for Somalia (2011) and the Somalia policy paper.

One of the lessons learned from previous and existing programmes within areas in conflict is that the following principles should be pursued:

1. A conceptual understanding that security is a fundamental precondition for sustainable development;
2. Grounding in the local context;
3. Ownership – optimise local anchoring to the extent possible;
4. Promotion of regional cooperation and coherence;
5. Realism regarding what can be achieved in unstable and politicised environments and an acceptance that there are higher than normal risks involved;
6. Joint/harmonised programming to be utilised where feasible.

The design of the programme has also taken account of the OECD/Development Assistance Committee’s Principles for good donor engagement in fragile states and situations, which reflect the lessons learned noted above.

Other initiatives to which the programme aligns include the current international efforts to counter piracy (including the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the legal sub working group chaired by Denmark), the development of regional maritime security strategies, IGAD’s Peace and Security Strategy, and the efforts to develop a UN Integrated Strategic Framework, which is likely to result in a more comprehensive strategy for Somalia.

5 Programme Framework and Objectives

Development Objective
As promotion of security is expected to lead to increased or improved stability, the overall development objective for this programme is defined as:

| Development Objective | Greater stability and security in the region through the strengthening of selected strategic national institutions and partners and regional cooperation. |
The second pillar of the Danish policy for Somalia has the objective to promote stability and security locally, nationally, regionally and internationally. The development objective of this component is seen as contributing to this as well as to the Strategy for the Danish Counter-piracy Effort.

**Immediate objectives**
The development objective is underpinned by three immediate objectives, each defining a component of this programme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate Objective 1</th>
<th>Strengthened regional stabilisation through enhanced peace keeping capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Objective 2</td>
<td>Preventing and countering piracy as well as stabilisation of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Objective 3</td>
<td>Regional control with illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia, and counter-terrorism/anti radicalisation efforts are increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Component 1: Strengthened regional stabilisation and peace keeping capacity**
This component is designed to contribute to initiatives and operations supporting regional peace keeping capacities in order to contribute to stability at local, national, regional and international levels. The three main sub-components each have clearly defined outcomes as described below. In addition, a small amount is allocated to the Danish Defence Command to enable rapid response to needs arising in relation to the first two sub-components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Strengthened regional stabilisation and peace keeping capacity</th>
<th>Total: 70 million DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-component</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Budget DKK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Capacity building of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF).</td>
<td>EASF capable of responding efficiently and effectively to regional crises as a part of the African Standby Force.</td>
<td>15 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Project support to the establishment of a Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability in connection with the EASF.</td>
<td>A Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability fully operational and compliant with EASF and African Standby Force standards by 2015.</td>
<td>26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Un-earmarked support to the AMISOM Trust Fund.</td>
<td>AMISOM capable of expanding and enhancing its control in Somalia in accordance with its mandate.</td>
<td>25 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Local Grant for Danish Defence Command.</td>
<td>Flexible support to assist implementation of sub-components 1.1 and 1.2.</td>
<td>4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The logic of supporting the first two outcome areas is that they will provide the AU and regional organisations (particularly in East Africa) with a deployable long term and sustainable peace keeping capacity provided by member states. The purpose of a functional peace keeping capacity is that it can be used to contain and stabilise threats to peace in situations where combined military, police and civilian forces are required. This will contribute to the implementation and strengthening of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Good progress has already been made towards this objective. The support to be provided to further develop the regional rapid response capability by assisting EASF in establishing an additional unit in Rwanda to those in Kenya and Uganda supported by the UK must also be seen in this context. This will be an additional capacity that will help the regional body to meet emerging peace support challenges where a quick and robust response is needed. Moreover, EASF is widely regarded as being one of the drivers of the African Standby Force and it can thus have an impact on the overall success of the ASF effort.

The PSF Programme will build on support that has already been provided through the Nordic defence cooperation. It feeds into an area where the region has demonstrated a capacity and willingness to act in a stabilisation role – as witnessed by the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Darfur – but where further external assistance is still needed. Thus, the third sub-component will provide un-caveated funds to support the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (through the trust fund administered by UNSOA), in line with its stabilisation mandate. The direct support to AMISOM is crucial for the mission’s support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, and the Danish contribution will support AMISOM in their efforts to stabilise the situation in South Central Somalia (particularly Mogadishu). The un-caveated nature of the funds entails that it will accommodate flexibility in funding requested by the AU. The support will thus be able to fund everything from transportation, food and medicine to all types of equipment, including vehicles, spare parts and communications technology as well as weapons. The risk management of the support will be closely coordinated with the UK. There is a positive linkage here to the first sub-component, as the support to EASF will include assistance to deploy EASF staff officers to AMISOM Headquarters in Mogadishu. A request has been submitted for EASF to further enhance its commitment to the Mission, which may require further donor support. Besides being a very positive signal of the commitment of both EASF and the member states, this will help extend lessons learned from the type of operational deployment that EASF could face on a larger scale in the future.

Sub-component 1.1: Further development of the Eastern African Standby Force
The aim of this sub-component is to support the EASF to achieve full operational capability by 2015. It capitalises on the excellent relations between the EASF, its secretariat in Nairobi and the Danish military advisers. It targets key priority areas identified in the EASF’s Strategic Plan in accordance with the general division of labour agreed between international partners and EASF.

Progress has been made in EASF (after a hiatus in the first half of 2010 due to staff rotations) in relation to concept development and training. The key EASF elements – the coordination mechanism/secretariat (known as EASFCOM), the planning element, brigade headquarters,
and (to a lesser extent) the logistics base - all now have minimum staffing from member states. The latter two are on a skeleton basis, but can be expected to be augmented during the next few years as the EASF approaches full operating capability in 2015. This may result in a need for additional (or redeployed) advisors.

The EASF land component includes military, police and civilian elements provided by member states. While the Danish support provided so far has focused mainly on the first of these, some funding has been provided through the Africa Programme for Peace for training of staff of the police and civilian elements. There is hence a need to ensure a close coordination between the funding of activities under the Peace and Stabilisation Programme and the Africa Programme for Peace.

The EASF provided a successful Command Post Exercise in late 2008 followed by a Field Training Exercise with Danish support in late 2009. In January 2011, a revised Memorandum of Understanding and a Policy Framework were agreed upon. Heads of State also agreed to offer the EASF capacities in support of the AU’s mission in Somalia, an offer that the AU has accepted. Steps have been taken to prepare a small EASF support contingent (14 experts, including medical and logistics officers) to augment the AMISOM mission headquarters in Mogadishu. The EASF Contingent was deployed in September 2011, and further contributions including a medical unit and 30 trainers have already been requested by the AU.

In parallel, and as addressed by sub-component 1.2, there is a substantial focus on developing the regional rapid deployment capabilities necessary for EASF to be able to react quickly to emerging or existing crises.

The development of EASF is, however, not without its challenges. At the political level, these include difficult decision making processes and overlapping memberships of the regional political bodies. EASF members are also members of other regional organisations focusing on political issues and economic development. The potential difficulties here are exacerbated by the fact that the EASF is a functional institution (i.e. an ad-hoc grouping for a specific purpose) and not a regional organisation with a broad political, economic and security mandate as the others are. The EASF was separated from IGAD in 2007 and the relations between the two have, on occasion, been strained. However, there are now signs that this has improved, e.g. the development of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two organisations.

In addition to these political issues, there are also a number of procedural areas where progress is needed, including the current lack of a binding legal framework and binding arrangements for force deployment, and insufficient pledges in some areas (especially Police Units). While EASFCOM and the Military, Police and Civilian Planning Elements are much better staffed than previously, the technical capacity of staff officers – as in most multinational headquarters - varies and there is a regular capacity challenge due to high turnover.

EASF appears well supported by a large number of advisors, including the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff, which currently has two Danish staff officers. The large number of donors and the tendency towards ad hoc support arrangements suggests that the donor group
“Friends of EASF” needs to continue its efforts to secure a more harmonised approach to minimise unnecessary burdens on EASF, and limit donor driven agendas. A collection of documents regulating several harmonisation issues has been developed, and is expected to be accepted by the “Friends of EASF” and EASF in the near future.

In the medium term (i.e. within the next three years), there appears to be some scope to move towards a Medium Term Expenditure Framework based on multi-year budgeting as well as to more Results Based Management processes. These efforts are clear priorities for the present programme and will undoubtedly help provide greater transparency, financial predictability and assist efforts to maintain already satisfactory harmonised donor support.

The support to be provided through this component of the programme covers the following output areas:

Table 1: EASF project output areas:

1. Staff capacity building – including mentoring to senior staff;
2. Improved Results Based Management;
3. Exercises – including support to Command Post Exercises in 2011 and 2013 and Field Training exercises in 2012 and 2014;
4. Peace support operations and training – including training for Civil Military Cooperation and UN military police;
5. Deployment support – including support to EASF staff officers deployed to the AU mission in Somalia;
6. Concept development – including concepts, manuals and Standard Operating Procedures derived from the Concept of Operations;
7. Support to training courses;

The content and approach to these are described in further detail in the Component 1 description.

Sub-component 1.2: Development of the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability

This sub-component supports the development of the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability in accordance with the Road Map for the African Standby Force and the AU and EASF endorsed concepts for these important capabilities. Rwanda is a large troop-contributing country to peace keeping operations. The Rwanda Defence Force is the project owner - in line with regional guidelines - and is responsible for the development of the capability as well as providing the necessary personnel resources, materiel and facilities.

However, the support will be provided within the regional (EASF) framework and is conditioned on the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) being made available to EASF. The support will be given in close cooperation with the UK which has been involved with the establishment of two RDC’s in Uganda and Kenya.
The Rwandan Defence Staff have developed a model for the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability that is inspired by its Kenyan counterpart and is formed around a combat group of around 1500 personnel. This includes an infantry battalion; medical, logistic, aviation, and field engineer units; a disaster management capability, and police and civilian elements. There may be slight changes to this model as the design process progresses. While smaller in size than the model provided in the AU’s concept, the Rwandan unit will correspond broadly to it in capability terms. The Rapid Deployment Capabilities are seen as the backbone of the EASF force structure.

The support project will be led by Denmark and will be harmonized with the support being provided by the United Kingdom to equivalent units in Kenya and Uganda. The project will involve the stationing of a small team of up to five technical advisors in Rwanda, support provided by Danish personnel stationed in Nairobi and travelling instructors/experts from Denmark and, to a lesser extent, other countries. Preliminary talks with the United Kingdom indicate that the UK might contribute through training and harmonization activities designed to ensure that the three EASF rapid deployment units are interoperable and capable of interfacing with EASF. The cooperation and coordination with the UK might also lead to joint support to the Kenyan and Ugandan rapid deployment capacities. This arrangement will be formalised as soon as possible during the inception phase of the project in late 2011/early 2012. Coordination and cooperation with other partners will also be further explored, which might include the US funded African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme, which currently supports Rwandan troops in pre-mission training towards missions in Darfur.

It is a precondition for the support that the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability is formally pledged to the EASF with a proposed date for initial operation of 2013 and full operational capability by 2015 in line with the AU’s Road Map.

The precise support required and working modalities will be subject to refinement during the inception phase in early 2012 in conjunction with the Rwandan authorities and other parties and can be expected to cover the following output areas:

Table 2: Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) output areas:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Manning concept development – including the Table of Organisation &amp; Equipment which is a key document;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Infrastructure Concept - including the physical headquarters and deployable headquarters, logistics and training facilities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Operational concept – concept development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Logistical concept - concept development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Communications concept - concept development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Training needs analysis and training &amp; education – including exercises;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Force generation/rostering concept - concept development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Integration requirements with EASF &amp; other EASF units;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Arrangements relating to the Formed Police Unit/police component;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Arrangements relating to Civilian Experts/Civilian component.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The content and approach to these is described in further detail in the Component 1 description. The major areas of expenditure are the support to infrastructure where it is proposed to provide support to the permanent and deployable headquarters and to training, which includes exercises.

From the outset of the formulation of the programme risk identification and mitigation has been an integral part of the programming process. Being cognisant of certain risks involved, a political and management risk analysis of this sub-component was prepared by external consultants in December 2010\(^6\), in order to identify risk mitigating actions.

The analysis highlighted a range of risks, together with possible mitigating actions, that should be taken into account in the project. While it was assessed that Rwanda had performed relatively well against a number of socio-economic parameters and was relatively stable and would be a reliable partner – there were some negative trends (including in relation to democratisation, human rights and the previous military engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo) that should be closely monitored. The Embassy in Kampala will provide inputs as part of the general political reporting on Rwanda. Close monitoring of the situation will be conducted by the Danish military advisors stationed in Rwanda. In addition, the programme will be subject to a midterm review, which will provide a general assessment as well as recommendations for adjustments, if found necessary.

The identification of local and regional civil society organisations to ensure that training includes human rights, gender and rule of law components will also be considered to mitigate risks - complementing the already planned training related to these issues.

The proposed cooperation with the UK can also be seen as a risk mitigation measure (especially in view of the UK’s current support to the other rapid deployment capabilities in Uganda and Kenya), and the presence of an on-site Danish military advisory team is also regarded as a risk mitigation measure.

**Sub-component 1.3: Support to the AMISOM Trust Fund**

This sub-component will maintain Danish support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through a further contribution to the AMISOM Trust Fund administered by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). The UN is providing vital logistical support to the mission.

Denmark is a valued contributor to the AMISOM Trust Fund through its non-DAC funding to non-lethal Contingent Owned Equipment (USD 2 million) in 2010. In view of the general observation from UNSOA and AMISOM Headquarters that fully un-caveated funding is most useful, a further Danish contribution of DKK 25 million (non-DAC) will be given to the Trust Fund.

The support provided to AMISOM can be expected to contribute the following output:

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\(^{6}\) *Risk analysis concerning possible military cooperation with Rwanda. COWI, December 2010*
Table 3: AMISOM output areas:

1. AMISOM is able to expand and enhance its control in Somalia in accordance with its mandate.

The AU’s Peace and Security Council launched the African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM - with the agreement of the United Nations, in January 2007. Its mandate is to provide support to the Transitional Federal Government and transitional institutions in their stabilisation efforts and in the pursuit of political dialogue and reconciliation. AMISOM is also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to create the necessary conditions for reconstruction, reconciliation and the sustainable development of Somalia. Through UN Security Council Resolution 1964 (2010), the AU was authorized to increase the troop strength to 12,000 (from 8000). While other countries have been mentioned as possible troop contributors, it is expected that Burundi and Uganda will provide the additional troops alongside their existing contributions. EASFCOM and EASF member states are currently investigating options for force contributions from nations other than Burundi and Uganda.

There is a general view that AMISOM has made a positive and valued contribution to the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab insurgent elements from Mogadishu. AMISOM is currently providing limited humanitarian assistance (for example, by opening up its hospital to local patients) but personal protection needs continue to impose restrictions on its outreach. Offensive operations have come at a relatively high cost in terms of AMISOM casualties, although it appears that troop morale remains high. After some criticism, AMISOM is also now taking more rigorous steps to restrict civilian casualties, including through instituting “no-fire zones” (areas in which offensive action is not taken, for example near schools, mosques, and markets). The extension of AMISOM’s control opens up the need for civil/police related activities and for the delivery by the Transition Federal Government of basic services, including medical facilities, water and sanitation, education, and basic security/policing. Coupled with the increase in AMISOM troops, there will be an increasing demand for funds, including towards the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment (lethal and non-lethal) and, as opportunities arise, civilian activities.

The Danish contribution will furthermore, as described in sub-component 2.4 below, address and assist with stabilising the situation in South Central Somalia enabling AMISOM and the government to respond actively to recent progress against the Al-Shabaab insurgency.

The AMISOM Trust Fund has the purpose of providing support in areas that are not covered by assessed funding but nonetheless critical for implementation of AMISOM’s mandate and to ensure parity with UN standards. UNSOA has established a supply-chain to AMISOM in Mogadishu for vital provisions, including food, water, fuel, medical supplies and vehicles and other equipment. In 2010, it provided construction of secure headquarters and accommodation. It also assists with troop rotations, medical evacuations and, to the extent

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7 It was noted by AMISOM and others that the security situation currently precludes civil/humanitarian activities without substantial AMISOM protection – which would imply diverting military resources from the military task.
possible, outreach activities related to the mission’s support to the Transitional Federal Government. The Fund has so far received contributions amounting to USD 38 million (USD 23 million non-caveated and USD 15 million caveated). UNSOA notes that all non-caveated funding has been used. The un-caveated nature of the Danish contribution entails that it will enable funding of everything from transportation, food and medicine to all types of equipment, including vehicles, spare parts and communications technology as well as weapons. The risk management of the support will be closely coordinated with the UK.

Previous Danish contributions to AMISOM have included:

- DKK 10 million was provided in 2009 via the AU with the aim of supporting civil and police aspects of the mandate. In mid-2011, it was agreed that unspent funding could be untied so that it can be used for more general AMISOM humanitarian support (while remaining within the caveat that it must be DAC-able).

- DKK 10 million was provided in 2010 through the PSF to the AMISOM Trust Fund to support reimbursement of Contingent Owned Equipment, medical facilities, troop welfare, transport of troops and equipment, and an Integrated Operations Centre in Nairobi with the aim of improving coordination in relation to AMISOM’s inputs in Somalia. This support was un-earmarked (in relation to the Contingent Owned Equipment), although it was not to be used for lethal equipment, and came from non-DAC funds.

During discussions with AMISOM and UNSOA in Nairobi in June 2011, it was highlighted that un-caveated contributions (including if possible the potential for allocation to Contingent Owned Equipment for lethal equipment) would provide maximum flexibility. Among the needs highlighted were fighting and support equipment and items for self-sustainment. These include vehicles and spares, personal protection, communications equipment, computers, water, hygiene, medical, catering (welfare packages), and engineering equipment.

In order to ensure that maximum flexibility is provided to AMISOM and UNSOA, DKK 25 million will be provided through the current programme as fully un-earmarked support, that is to say it may be used to reimburse the costs of lethal equipment, e.g. weapons. It will thus be drawn from non-DAC funds. The other major donors also contributing fully un-earmarked funding to the AMISOM Trust Fund are the UK and Turkey. Should there be an urgent need for additional funds for AMISOM after 2011, the possibilities for meeting this will be considered in relation to the programme’s unallocated funds.

The funding will be transferred as early as possible and managed in accordance with the Trust Fund’s Terms of Reference. During discussions with AMISOM and UNSOA in Nairobi in June 2011 the need to improve UNSOA/AMISOM coordination was emphasised, and increased transparency is essential, especially as the AMISOM HQ progressively deploys to Mogadishu. In addition, dialogue with the AU Peace and Security Operations Department in Addis Ababa regarding strategic and political direction is important. Furthermore measures to promote a higher profile of Denmark in the Joint Security Committee for Somalia, as well as
promoting donor coordination, will be explored, to ensure a linkage between the programme and ongoing political initiatives aimed at stabilisation.

**Component 2: Preventing and countering piracy as well as stabilisation of Somalia**

It is widely recognised that a long-term and sustainable solution to the problem of piracy is to be found on land in Somalia. Without peace, stability and development in Somalia, there will not be an end to piracy. However, it is necessary to address piracy on multiple fronts, combining naval efforts with support to regional capacity building and dealing with the challenges related to the prosecution and incarceration of pirates.

The component focuses on maritime security as especially piracy is seen as a major contributing factor to the in-stability of the region and as such directly aims at implementing the Danish Somalia Strategy as well as the Strategy for the Danish Counter-piracy Effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Budget DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Increased percentage of pirates caught are processed through the legal system based on principles of due process.</td>
<td>4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>EASF Maritime Component contributes with regional staff capacity to one or more regional or continental (AU) maritime operations (e.g. within the framework of AMISOM)</td>
<td>6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Kenyan Coast-guard capability strengthened and solid foundation for an effective coast-guard established.</td>
<td>48 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Improved rule of law in Somalia with a special emphasis on Puntland.</td>
<td>45 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning maritime security and counter-piracy, there are a number of emerging international and regional frameworks and initiatives, which need to be taken into account when dealing with the issue of regional stability in the Wider Horn of Africa. These are: The Contact Group on
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Strategy for the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region, the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the AU’s initiated work on a maritime strategy, IGAD’s Inland Piracy Plan, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield (with periodical Danish participation) and EU stabilisation efforts, including Operation Atalanta (with no Danish participation). The EU is funding many of these initiatives and the initiation of an AU maritime strategy may be funded either through the APP II or by using un-allocated funds in the PSF, if an acceptable proposal is presented by the AU. The EU is also considering a possible CSDP-mission to the Horn of Africa.

While the developments in these international and regional frameworks should be followed closely, this component will fund directly the Danish led Working Group 2 under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which deals with the many judicial aspects of piracy. Denmark works actively to strengthen the international legal efforts to combat piracy off the Coast of Somalia in particular through the Danish chairmanship of Working Group 2 (legal issues) of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. It is a cornerstone in the international fight against piracy to ensure that pirates are prosecuted. As per November 2011 more than 1000 pirates are being prosecuted in 20 States worldwide. It is important to continue to explore the legal aspects of post-trial transfer initiated by the Danish led WG2 where sentenced pirates are prosecuted in one – often regional - State and subsequently transferred to Somalia (Puntland or Somaliland) to serve their sentence in UN-monitored prisons.

In addition the EASF is developing a maritime cell, with the objective of creating a stand-by force, which may be deployed in peace-keeping operations, where maritime security is an important element. Presently there is a lack of such a capacity in the AMISOM contingency in Mogadishu.

The rationale for supporting increased regional capacity development of maritime security is to enable national maritime security forces in the region, such as the Kenya Navy, to contribute more effectively to the international counter-piracy efforts, as well as enhancing the region’s own capacity to combat the threat of piracy emanating from Somalia. This requires a long-term commitment from donors, and efforts should primarily be related to counter-piracy initiatives, although strengthened capacity will also yield dividends in areas such as illegal fishing, toxic waste dumping, human trafficking and smuggling. The increased regional capacity of maritime security - and especially the capacity to counter piracy - will consequently contribute to regional stabilisation. Denmark is also involved in the important coordination efforts, which are taking place as part of the Working Group 1 of CGPCS.

In addition, Denmark has provided limited support to the Djiboutian Coast Guard since 2008. This will be continued at the present level during this programme period, partly due to the broader Danish naval cooperation with the country and the use of Djibouti harbour when conducting anti-piracy operations.

Concerning the developments inside Somalia, there is a need to adopt an integrated, long-term approach in order to address the root causes for engaging in piracy activities and to combat
piracy. Many observers stress that piracy should be combated on land through long-term state-
and peace-building engagements in Somalia.
The Danish PSF programme will support a broader justice sector and rule of law programme, 
which will complement the Danish Somalia Programme mentioned above. Support will be 
provided for two programmes managed by UNDP and UNODC in strategic cooperation with 
likeminded donors such as the UK, Norway and Sweden. The two programmes will be closely 
monitored together with these other donors. Denmark currently has no presence in Somalia 
but the Embassy in Nairobi will actively monitor the programme together with like-minded 
donors. A security and rule of law engagement in Somalia should be implemented flexibly in 
such a way that when new opportunities for support to improved security and rule-of-law 
opens up then the Danish programme is able to respond quickly and effectively. Presently there 
is reason to be cautiously optimistic with regard to the situation in Puntland which currently 
appears to be receptive for a more concerted effort to improve the rule of law as the 
Government of Puntland as well as civil society appears to actively counter criminal gangs and 
piracy syndicates.

Various UN organizations (UNODC, UNDP and UNPOS) are implementing rule-of-law and 
access-to-justice programmes in Somalia with some success, although limited funding appears 
to hamper their efforts. However, UN interventions have been criticised for lacking cohesion 
and political effect. To remedy this, the UN has formulated an Integrated Strategic Framework 
(ISF) for Somalia to improve coherence in their overall activities. Denmark is – together with 
other partners like the EU, UK, and Norway – in close contact with UN agencies to ensure 
close collaboration, coordination and programme cohesion. Denmark will – to the extent 
possible – assume certain responsibilities in terms of strengthening donor coordination, not 
least in Nairobi where UN Somalia activities are managed. Through added resources in 
personnel, the embassy will be able to take on a lead role in coordination processes. 
Furthermore strengthened advisory capacity to UNPOS will be considered to assist this 
process, in addition to the SSR advisor where funding has been committed through the 
Multilateral Advisory Account.

Sub-component 2.1: International coordination on counter-piracy efforts 
through the Danish chairmanship of WG2
The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS or the Contact Group) was 
established in 2009 by the countries and organizations most affected by the increased number 
of piracy attacks off the Coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean in order to coordinate the 
international efforts against piracy. Denmark participates as an important sea-faring nation, 
which handles about 10 per cent of global maritime shipping measured by value. Denmark 
chairs the judicial sub Working Group 2, which - in up to now 9 meetings – is working actively 
to find practical solutions to the many judicial challenges related to piracy. Working Group 2 is 
charged with providing specific, practical and legally sound guidance to CGPCS on legal issues 
related to the fight against piracy with a view to ensure the prosecution of suspected pirates. So 
far the discussions of the working group have resulted in a number of concrete legal “tools” 
gathered in a legal tool box consisting of common legal standards in a number of areas 
connected to the military efforts and in relation to the collection of evidence in order to ensure 
prosecution of pirates. The working group has had a thorough discussion of mechanisms for
prosecution, armed guards, human rights considerations, and not least capacity building of, and collaboration with, countries in the region on legal proceedings in piracy cases and transfer of pirates sentenced in one state and transferred for serving of sentence to prisons in Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland).

Table 4: International cooperation on maritime security output areas:

| 1. | Improved international cooperation on combating piracy of the coast off Somalia. |

The Danish chairmanship of Working Group 2 will through an allocation of 4 million DKK from 2010 -14 be able to conduct three annual meetings, including covering travel expenses for participants from countries in the region, conference facilities, as well as preparations for meetings, and hereby help promote justice sector capacity building and good governance on the Horn of Africa.

The funds will be administered and activities monitored by the Department for Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sub-component 2.2: Improved regional cooperation concerning counter-piracy through the support of EASF maritime component

It is envisaged that by having maritime institutions – coast-guards functions and navies – in the region cooperating on creating a maritime stand-by capability, this will lead to increased cooperation and joint operations, which will have an effect in areas such as countering piracy.

The activities, as defined by EASF’s strategic plan, are:

- Managing the development of the EASF Maritime Component;
- Establish regional maritime Communication Information System to improve Maritime Domain Awareness, and for maritime command and control;
- Develop and integrate surveillance capabilities in the interest of the region, both Land, Sea and Air based;
- Utilising educational and training facilities for capacity/competence building;
- Enhance and develop regional maritime capabilities;
- Develop more cohesive cross-border cooperation on operational matters and for closer cooperation on maintenance and logistics support;
- In cooperation with other national and regional institutions establish a legal framework for the use of maritime forces and structures in support of non-military missions and tasks;
- Engage with other international, regional and national stakeholders to ensure proper coordination and cooperation with regards to developing maritime assets and capabilities and for the utilization of these assets for the conduct of maritime peace and security tasks across the crisis spectrum;
- Training and Exercise;
Plan, Participate and execute Joint Maritime exercises;
Test the Maritime Component during an exercise.

- Maritime operations;
  - Seek opportunities for conducting sub-regional combined maritime operations related to current threats, e.g. counter-piracy ops;
  - Provide planning support for Maritime Operations, e.g. AMISOM;
  - Contingency planning – Develop Maritime Campaign Plan for Regional Counter Piracy Operations.

Table 5: Improved regional cooperation concerning counter-piracy output areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Improved regional cooperation concerning counter-piracy output areas:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Danish support to developing the maritime component will be a total of 6 million DKK with 1 million DKK allocated for 2011 and 2 million DKK for 2012 and 2013 and 1 million DKK for 2014 and will together with funding from other donors contribute to funding the development of the Maritime Component.

Sub-component 2.3: The Kenya Navy’s capability strengthened as a solid foundation for a Kenyan counter-piracy capacity as well as for a regional maritime PSO capacity

Support for Kenya’s maritime capability is an important aspect of countering piracy in the region, contributing to building of regional capacity. The Kenyan government is yet to make a decision of what model it chooses to ensure the institutionalisation of a coast guard function. Support will be focussed on providing important supplements to existing maritime capacity. Furthermore, possible cooperation with other donors might be explored, as well as possible support to a future (civilian) CSDP-mission.

A number of initiatives will be initiated to strengthen the Kenya Navy’s existing capacity, including the donation of equipment. These donation projects include technical support, the delivery of spare-parts and tools, and test equipment (the delivery of test-bench) which will enable the Kenya Navy to maintain its operational readiness, thereby assisting in the maritime security, including counter piracy activities.

Denmark has over recent years had a number of high-level initial contacts concerning possible support to the Kenya Navy. This has included a visit to Denmark by the Chief of the Kenya Navy, Lieutenant General S. Mwathethe (Deputy Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces). But there has been little practical cooperation with and no direct support to the Kenya Navy. Hence, it will be necessary in an inception phase to identify the relevant needs of the Navy in order to define the detailed support. Given the urgency to build counter-piracy capacity in Kenya and the region, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish Defence Command will continuously consider and monitor the capacity of and the collaboration with the Kenya Navy.
Furthermore support for improved security around the Mombasa harbour, including possible surveillance capacity, is being considered. This process is still on-going and the identification and formulation of possible activities will be decided at a later stage, based on careful analysis and capacity assessment. Management of future support, where formulation is still on-going, will be decided at a later stage.

The project management of the direct support for the Kenya Navy will be the responsibility if the Danish Defence Command. The Defence Command will appoint up to two “programme officers” for this cooperation, who may need to be posted to Kenya for considerable lengths of time.

Funds will be administered by the Defence Command following the rules and procedures of the Defence Command for implementing projects under the Danish PSF. This sub-component is described further in the Component 2 description.

**Sub-component 2.4: Improved rule of law in Somalia**

This section provides a description of the support, which will be provided by Denmark to Somalia in the areas of security and rule of law. It should be stressed that this supplements the Danish Somalia Programme of approx. DKK 600 million for the period 2011-14, which include governance, development and humanitarian assistance and which particularly supports free and democratic elections to be held in Somaliland and Puntland as well as support to strengthen local governments’ capacities in Somalia. As mentioned above, there is a need for a more comprehensive approach to counter-piracy in Somalia. Countering piracy needs to be approached from a general governance and rule of law context and be closely coordinated with development assistance to Somalia. The situation cannot simply be solved by stand-alone projects such as building prisons.

The counter-piracy and stabilisation activities on land will be carried out through support to UNDP and UNODC. Through these two organisations the programme will support an integrated approach to justice- and security sector development, inter alia, through training of judicial capacity, police and security sector reform as well as expanding existing prison capacity.
These activities are essential in preventing and countering piracy, by ensuring the prosecution of suspected pirates, as well as the broader stabilisation of Somalia.

The support for the two organisations will be given primarily as an un-earmarked contribution to the ongoing justice and security sector reform and development, youth at risk, as well as community outreach and awareness activities, and with a specific emphasis on Puntland in 2012. This will enable the UN to carry out more long term planning as well as ensuring the necessary flexibility to rapidly respond to developments on the ground. This may be seen as a continuation of the past Danish support to the UNDP rule-of-law programme.

Since a large part of the present challenges from piracy emanate from Puntland – which was also highlighted during the meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia in Copenhagen on 29-30 September 2011 – there is presently a window of opportunity for supporting a strengthened international cooperation in Puntland in the area of justice and security sector reform. Based on these developments, a part of the contribution will be earmarked for UN activities in the Puntland region, including the building of prison capacity in Garowe and possibly coastal policing capacity building. Furthermore, the agreements with UNDP and UNODC will allow for flexibility in terms of responding to possible activities in South Central Somalia. In addition to this, development funds from the Somalia Programme can be used to accommodate specific livelihood and development-related activities and requests for South Central Somalia.

The UN system in relation to Somalia is complex, but there have been recent attempts to improve coordination of the various UN agencies. The main overall documents guiding this coordination are the “Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework”\(^8\) (ISF) and the “United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy 2011-15” (UNSAS). Both contain sections on good governance and human security.

The main agencies concerning security and rule-of-law are:

- **UNPOS**, which are supposed to have an overall political lead role and conduct a security sector assessment. Such an assessment has been done for South Central of Somalia but is still pending for Puntland and Somaliland.
- **UNDP**, which will by the end of 2011 finalise its third phase of the Rule of law and Security Programme\(^9\).
- **UNODC** has developed a Programme Concept for “Combating Maritime Piracy in the Horn of Africa, March 2011 – March 2014” which includes building and improving prison facilities as well as transfer of prisoners from the region to these prisons. UNODC has also initiated a media and awareness campaign against piracy.
- There are a number of Trust Funds related to maritime security most importantly the “Trust Fund to support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia”. This trust fund is an important funder of the UNDP and UNODC programmes.

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\(^8\) Field Draft. 30 March 2011.
Denmark would have preferred the development of one single UN rule of law programme coordinated between the different UN agencies. Since this was not possible, mechanisms will be set in place to ensure close coordination between UN organisations as well as close donor coordination. Denmark is – together with other partners like the EU, UK, and Norway – discussing directly with UN the agencies how best to ensure close collaboration, coordination and programme cohesion. Denmark will – to the extent possible – assume a lead role in terms of strengthening donor coordination, not least in Nairobi where UN Somalia activities are managed from. Furthermore, strengthened advisory capacity to UNPOS will be considered to assist this process.

As UNDP and UNODC are still in the process of finalising their programmes, ensuring greater coordination and coherence between the two programmes, the following description of the programmes is therefore only preliminary:

Table 7: UN rule of law output areas:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Strengthened institutional and technical capacity of police services in Puntland including in coastal areas;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Improved credibility, efficacy, and independence of the judicial system;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Enhanced capacity of judges, lawyers, and other adjudicators to reconcile and harmonise the various legal systems with international human rights instruments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Humane and secure imprisonment in Puntland and Somaliland – including a prison in Garowe, which live up to international standards as well as upgrading of existing facilities and training of prison staff, through the UNODC Piracy Prisoner Transfer Programme;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Law reforms concerning justice sector including of improvement of legal framework for maritime security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Prison transfer programme for Somali pirates sentenced in neighbouring countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Media and awareness campaign against piracy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The agreements with the two organisations will cover all support to each organisation, and the programmes will be managed jointly by UNODC and UNDP-Somalia in line with the expected joint programme coordination, including a clear division of labour and a joint monitoring plan. UNDP and UNODC will report to the donors according to general UN procedures. Furthermore the establishment of a management structure including the donors of the programmes, e.g. a steering committee, will be explored, to ensure the possibility of Denmark to follow programme implementation and possible adjustments.

The budget will – as mentioned above – consist of un-earmarked funding and is expected to be allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mio. DKK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Component 3: Regional control with illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia and counter-terrorism/anti radicalisation efforts are increased

This component relates to two pervasive threats emanating from the unstable situation in and around Somalia that have local, regional and international impacts. There is widespread consensus that international and regional efforts to hinder the laundering of funds from piracy and other sources and counter the links in the region to international terrorism should be an integrated part of regional stabilisation efforts. While Denmark is already contributing to this effort at the international level and also has an initiative in the region – i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya - there exists substantial capacity hurdles, which need to be overcome before a mature programme can be developed. Indicative of this situation is that fact that UNODC, which is one of the main international actors in the area, only has relatively modest regional programmes relating to anti-money laundering/counter terrorism financing. Currently, there are several proposals for a national programme for Ethiopia. However, no such plans exist for Kenya and the consensus appears to be, that there is a need to wait for the outcome of the 2012 elections before a meaningful dialogue can be held on concrete steps to be taken.

In view of this situation, this component is described in framework-form at the present time. Further work will be undertaken to define its substance over the course of 2012. It should be focused on Kenya and Ethiopia, as these countries are where past efforts have been concentrated. In addition, it is proposed to include the possibility for supporting efforts to generate greater visibility and understanding of regional trends, including financial transfers that can help define more targeted programmes.

In the area of anti-money laundering, regional experts point to the absence of regulatory authorities in Somalia and the general lack of capacity in Ethiopia and Kenya to put in place the structures necessary to control illicit financial flows. The situation in Kenya appears to be of particular concern given evidence of money laundering in Nairobi, Mombasa and other areas. It is estimated that the (cash) proceeds of piracy now amount to around USD 200 million a year (making it the second largest source of income in Somalia according to UNODC). Basic legislation (relating to counter terrorism and anti-money laundering) is not fully in place and only a limited number of meaningful steps have been taken to set up the structures necessary to pursue these issues. The situation appears somewhat better in Ethiopia (where the government has established a Financial Intelligence Unit in line with international recommendations) but few concrete steps have been taken to put in place the machinery necessary to monitor formal and informal financial institutions. It is indicative that UNODC, which otherwise takes a lead in this area, has been so far unable to make substantial inroads, although there are plans to do so in Ethiopia (where the Government has requested assistance). UNODC currently has only limited expertise on the ground in these areas and tend to rely upon headquarters in Vienna when experts are required.

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10 The illicit financial flows linked to piracy off the coast of Somalia, UNODC, May 2011
It is also relevant that the Financial Action Task Force, the international body that is monitoring international efforts to implement measures to counter terrorism financing, has been increasing its focus on both countries with a view to possible blacklisting. Denmark is already supporting (through previous projects of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund) a project from the US-based Centre on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation (CGCC) to raise awareness and knowledge of the issue in Ethiopia. There are signs of increasing Ethiopian interest in responding positively to the FATF recommendations.

With regard to counter terrorism, Denmark is supporting IGADs Capacity-building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) as well as a project to establish a regional counter-terrorist network aimed at strengthening counter terrorism cooperation among IGAD states and enhance the ratification and implementation of relevant IGAD conventions through another Centre on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation project. Both of these initiatives attempt to link overall awareness-raising at the political level with training relating to implementation of international and regional counter terrorism legislation. As such, they support regional efforts to strengthen the response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) amongst other requirements. As these initiatives are already funded, it is not intended to add further direct counter terrorism activities in this programme through either IGAD/ICPAT or the Centre on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation.

Closely related to the counter terrorism agenda are preventative measures designed to counter radicalisation amongst the Muslim population of Kenya, which is largely located in the coastal region. These efforts are included within the Danish Good Governance Programme. There are also proposals being developed by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service based on a recognition that fighting terrorism effectively requires traditional intelligence and police efforts to be supplemented by a more wide-ranging and inclusive preventive approach, which addresses the underlying causes for radicalisation and creates broader coalitions in society against militant extremism. These proposals currently need further development.

It is premature to initiate further inputs in these areas until certain indicators have been achieved. These include: in Kenya and Ethiopia, the manning of the Financial Intelligence Units with a minimum professional staff, which would allow UNODC (or other international actors) to launch meaningful capacity building programmes. Such programmes should seek to increase knowledge and awareness at the political level (“buy in”) with the building blocks (structures) necessary to increase capacity to monitor and control regular financial institutions and increase regulatory contact with the informal sector, including hawala and mobile telephone operators. It can be expected that this situation will not be in place until end of 2012 or early 2013 in Kenya and possibly earlier in Ethiopia.

In both areas, it is recognised that the development of projects between Denmark and Ethiopia/Kenya can open up possibilities for a more operational cooperation at the official level, something that has been emphasised by the Ethiopian authorities. It is also important that the further work required to take this component forward makes use of expertise that is available, including at the operational level, from UNODC (also in Vienna) as well as other potential partners and resource persons.
In the meantime, it would be worth developing greater knowledge of regional trends, including in relation to the political economy of the Somalia conflict, financial transaction patterns, local drivers of piracy, and community responses to provide a deeper understanding of the context and possibilities for gaining traction. In the case of Ethiopia, this can build upon the experiences being gained through the existing project with the Centre on Global Counter Terrorism Cooperation, which could be expected to contribute to these goals. The Centre is currently aiming at conducting a baseline survey of existing capacity within the financial institutions to address issues of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. Meanwhile, the World Bank is set to launch some studies into the financial aspects of piracy.

This suggests that a targeted project definition process be established with the overall aim of delivering a component within this programme that will increase and strengthen the region’s ability to monitor and control financial flows and to counter radicalisation with a view to limiting the negative effects of both on regional stability. The process should be expected to include a mapping study leading to a fully developed component description in line with the above objective. The possibility of contributing to more in-depth political economy analysis should also be kept in mind.

6 Implementation Plan
The implementation plans for each component and subcomponent are described in detail in the component descriptions.

7 Sustainability and Exit Strategy
The programme strategy prioritises sustainability and the possibility of a viable exit. Essentially, this revolves around building up local capacities in a manner that is consistent with local needs and resources, bearing in mind that there is often an inherent contradiction between the two. To mitigate the risk of developing structures that are unsustainable, careful attention needs to be paid to the local context in the planning and implementation phases and to joint monitoring and reviewing, so that all parties are involved.

In relation to Component 1, the capacity building for the Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability and EASF will proceed on the basis of alignment with national plans, including the EASF’s Strategic Plan, and a close partnership with counterparts so that skills and experience of the latter are developed in parallel with the structures that are the focus of the cooperation. These two sub-components have relatively clear benchmarks and planning targets (Full Operating Capability in 2015 in accordance with the AU’s road map) and a key priority for the two projects is mutual identification of standards necessary to meet these. Danish support will join a corresponding input from the counterparts so that political and operational commitment is ensured.

In relation to Component 2, the capacity building is intended not to interfere with the Kenyan authorities’ decision on the modality of a coast guard function, which will provide a framework for building a sustainable coast guard while at the same time ensuring that the present capabilities are maintained. Concerning the rule of law programmes in Somalia there is,
especially in Puntland, a long way to go before such a programme can become sustainable, but increased ownership by local authorities, which will be prioritised in the new phase of the UN-programmes, is a good start for this.

In relation to Component 3, it is envisaged that a similar approach will be utilised as in Component 1.

8 Cross-cutting Issues and Priority Themes

The programme will mainstream gender and human rights considerations across its components. In relation to Component 1, the programme will support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security. Denmark’s National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 (2008) provides a reference point for the Danish PSF programme. It stresses the prevention, protection, and participation dimensions in conflict and transition settings. In the further work with EASF and in developing the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability, these aspects will be integrated into training programmes together with humanitarian law and human rights law. The Danish Somalia Programme will also specifically support gender equality and implementation of Resolution 1325 in Somalia.

In Component 2, the present UNDP rule of law programme in Somalia is exemplary in mainstreaming gender as well as human rights, and this will be continued in the next phase. The human rights issues will be important in the support to a coast-guard function, as will the implementation of Resolution 1325 in relation to Component 2 in general.

In Component 3, gender and human rights concerns will be at the forefront of the potential initiative that could emerge relating to counter radicalisation. In relation to anti-money laundering, the gender dimensions of remittance systems will be included in any analysis undertaken and the findings fed into the design of the resulting project.

The programme is assessed to have no negative effects on the environment.

9 Budget

The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is a pooled funding account established as part of the Danish Defence Agreement 2010-2014. Overall Stabilisation Fund-specific procedures are provided in the Manual for the Danish Stabilisation Fund (October 2010). The Fund is made up of three types of funds: official development aid (ODA); non-ODA resources administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); and non-ODA appropriations managed by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), so-called ‘§12’ funds. The MFA has criteria and procedures in place to determine if a certain activity is reported as ‘ODA’ or not. All §12 funds are non-ODA.

The provisional programme budget is set out below. Some minor adjustments to this may be required within the overall funding ceiling presented.
### Table 8: DSF Programme budget 2011-2014 (MDKK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1: Regional peacekeeping and stabilisation</th>
<th>MDKK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>Non-ODA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-component 1.1: Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-component 1.2: EASF further development</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-component 1.3: AMISOM Trust Fund</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Grant for Defence Command</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 2: Preventing and countering piracy as well as stabilisation of Somalia</th>
<th>MDKK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>Non-ODA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-component 2.1: Working Group 2 of CGCPS</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-component 2.2: EASF maritime component</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-component 2.2: Kenya Navy and Djibouti coast guard</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-component 2.3: UN Rule of Law programme in Somalia with emphasis on Puntland</td>
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<td>45</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 3: Anti-money laundering &amp; counter radicalisation</th>
<th>MDKK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>Non-ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-component 3.1: Anti-money Laundering</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Sub-component 3.2: Counter radicalisation</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-component 3.2: Counter radicalisation</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th>MDKK</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>Non-ODA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reviews</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total DSF Programme** | **215 MDKK** | **107** | **108** |

### 10 Management and Organisation

The programme will be managed under the guidelines established by the Manual for the Danish Stabilisation Fund.

The overall management responsibility for the programme on behalf of the Danish Government rests with the Whole of Government Steering Group, which comprises members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s office, Ministry of Defence, Danish Defence Command, and Ministry of Justice.
The WGSS functions as the secretariat to the Steering Group and is responsible for the quality control of all stabilisation funds. The day-to-day responsibility of managing and monitoring the overall programme is delegated from WGSS to the MFA Africa Department (AFR). However, all major steps will be coordinated closely with the WGSS. The overall management and monitoring responsibility of AFR will be achieved based on inputs from Danish embassies in the region, Danish and other implementing partners, Danish defence sources, and taking account of other sources that are available. The monitoring will include monitoring of programme and component risks.

With regard to component 3 and those parts of components 1 and 2, which are still being developed, the MFA Africa Department is responsible for the programming process, with inputs from the Danish embassies, the MFA, MoD, the Danish Defence Command, and other Danish authorities, as appropriate. Due to the character of component 3, involvement of the MoD in the programming phase of this component will be slightly more limited than in relation to components 1 and 2. The finalisation and subsequent approval of the components, through the WGSS, rests with the Whole of Government Steering Group.

The use of unallocated programme funds will be decided on by the Whole of Government Steering Group. The unallocated funds are to be used on a demand-driven basis and are primarily anticipated to be allocated for activities under the three components of the programme. This will ensure programme cohesion as well as a narrow and focused scope of the programme. However, there should also be an option to fund activities in response to emerging and unforeseen developments on the ground. The MFA Africa Department is responsible for compiling proposals for the use of the unallocated funds with inputs from the Danish embassies, the MFA, MoD, the Danish Defence Command, and other Danish authorities, as appropriate.

**Management of the Components**

Management responsibility for the individual components/sub-components is as follows:

- The management of **Component 1** will, with regards to sub-components 1.1 and 1.2, initially rest with the Danish Defence Command, but will gradually be handed over to the EASF and the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability, as soon as their capacity to do so is secured. Sub-component 1.3, regarding the support to the AMISOM Trust Fund, will be managed by the MFA, through the embassy in Addis Ababa.

- The management of **Component 2** will, with regards to sub-component 2.1, be managed by the MFA Department for Legal Affairs. The Danish Defence Command will manage sub-component 2.2. Sub-component 2.3 will be managed by the Danish Defence Command, with regard to the specific support to the Kenyan Navy, which will, when possible, gradually be handed over to the Kenyan Navy.
The MFA Africa Department with support from the WGSS will be responsible for the programming and formulation, of the part of the sub-component which is still unallocated - the content of the sub-component still being subject of approval by the Steering Group.

Sub-component 2.4 will be managed by UNDP-Somalia and UNODC and supervised by the Danish Embassy in Nairobi.

Each of the management units will make a brief semi-annual report to the MFA Africa Department and the WGSS. The MFA Africa Department will use these to report to the Steering Group.

**Financial management and procurement**
The Financial management will from the start of the programme be the responsibility of:

a) The Danish MFA  
b) The Danish Defence Command and  
c) UNDP/UNODC, which use well-known and certified financial management and procurement systems.

These agencies will take responsibility for the sub-components as described in the section above.

For ownership and sustainability reasons it is the hope that local organisations e.g. EASFCOM and Kenya Navy will be able to take over this management, but this will only happen after their financial management and procurement systems have been assessed to live up to international standards.

**11 Monitoring, Reporting, Reviews and Evaluations**
Requirements relating to monitoring of the programme are outlined in the Component Descriptions. While the MFA Africa Department will have the overall responsibility of ensuring that monitoring reports, reviews and evaluations are shared among key stakeholders and are in accordance with programme indicators, the main elements relating to monitoring are:

a) **Component 1**: The Danish Defence Command and the project teams located with EASFCOM in Nairobi and the Rwandan Rapid Deployment Capability in Kigali will provide the main source of monitoring on a daily basis. An intended project group will be an important mechanism for policy dialogue and monitoring, as will “Friends of EASF” in relation to EASF. Regarding the AMISOM Trust Fund, the programme will utilise UNSOA’s standard reporting guidelines.

b) **Component 2**: The sub-component of the EASF maritime cell will be monitored and reported on as part of the support to EASF (see above). The main bulk of monitoring and reporting on subcomponent 2.3 will be done by the Danish Defence Command in conjunction with the Kenyan Navy, when a detailed work-plan has been agreed. The
Danish Embassy in Nairobi will monitor the overall political developments concerning the coast-guard.

UNDP-Somalia and UNODC will continue to monitor and report on the rule of law programme according to the normal UN monitoring and reporting rules and procedures, and the Danish embassy in Nairobi will monitor and advise on this through a donor group in Nairobi.

c) Arrangements in relation to Component 3 will need to be developed when the content of that component are clearer.

Concerning review and evaluation, it is regarded as important that a review is undertaken at approximately the mid-point in the programme (i.e. in early 2013) so that progress can be assessed and possible adjustments made. A key lesson learned from previous programmes is that actual implementation in fragile contexts may differ from plans and require a flexible approach. Both reviews and evaluations play an important role in enabling this and gaining experience. An end of programme assessment or evaluation should be undertaken in 2015 and may be done in conjunction with a possible new phase of the programme.

Monitoring and review/evaluation will be against the individual programme milestones and, at programme level, against the programme objectives set out in the programme indicators (Annex 1).

12 Risk analysis
The following provides an overview of overall key contextual, programmatic and institutional risks. Project related risks are included within the component descriptions.

The programme has high risks, but given that the PSF is created with a view to be able to also cater for high-risk situations, it is concluded that this programme should be undertaken and that the Whole of Government Steering Group in Copenhagen will analyse and evaluate risks on at least a biannual basis and if necessary take remedial action. The basis for this monitoring will include the regular reporting from Danish embassies in the region, reports from Danish and other (e.g. UN) implementing partners, and other assessments that are made available (e.g. from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service).
## Overall risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>Programmatic risk</th>
<th>Institutional risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Support conceived to be channelled to repressive forces in governments with lack of legitimacy.</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TFG and Puntland governments may fail. Rwanda accused of repression. Kenyan elections in 2012 will provide a test for the stability of the country, keeping in mind the unrest caused by the last elections.</td>
<td></td>
<td>While the situation in one of the countries may worsen, it is unlikely to happen in all, and unlikely to be lasting.</td>
<td>Reputational risk to Denmark and insecurity of Danish or other programme staff may be increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Political disagreements in implementing structures (e.g. EASF, Kenyan government and UN).</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EASF development has in the past been jeopardized by disagreements among member states. The various agencies involved in aspects of coast-guard duties have not yet agreed on a model.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Danish support to Kenyan Navy is to some extent depending on governmental decisions on the future construction of a Coast Guard. Support to EASF may be slowed-down or less effective if internal disagreement surfaces, and competition between UN organisations may make component less effective.</td>
<td>There may be reputational risk to Denmark if perceived to interfere in internal decisions of organisations and governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Donor cooperation and coordination not as developed as in main-stream development assistance.</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Insignificant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the non-DAC activities there appears to be a lack of donor coordination and cooperation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>There may be overlaps or even competition between donors which may affect effectiveness of the programme.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Risk factor</td>
<td>Probability</td>
<td>Background for assessment</td>
<td>Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Capacity lower than assessed in most organisations.</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>While the support to the various parts of the programme has been partly defined based on an assessment of capacity this may be even less than assessed initially.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lack of cohesion of the programme.</td>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>While the various components and sub-components each contribute to the overall objective, they are not necessarily connected.</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fiduciary risk-corruption.</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Some of the countries involved in this programme have a high degree of corruption in the public sector.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Major Contextual risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Risks</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governments in the region, some of which are supported by this programme, may fail (TFG, Puntland), become more repressive (Rwanda) or more unstable. (Kenya).</td>
<td>Systematic monitoring of risks through regularly (six monthly) reporting from Danish embassies in the region (Kampala, re. Rwanda, Nairobi re. Somalia and Kenya) to the Steering Group in order to adapt implementation to the changes in context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported regional organisations may be unable to act due to overlapping memberships and/or disagreement and competition between (leading) member states.</td>
<td>Steering group should monitor situation (as above).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora in Denmark involved in violent struggles through remittances, recruits to militias, etc.</td>
<td>Create links to counter-radicalisation efforts in Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyan military campaign in Somalia.</td>
<td>Denmark should underline the importance of ensuring that the Kenyan military campaign is coordinated regionally, with the TFG and IGAD, as well as internationally.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Major programmatic risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. (matrix)</th>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Risk assessment</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Support conceived to be channelled to repressive forces in governments with lack of legitimacy.</td>
<td>Possible/major (High)</td>
<td>Steering group should regularly monitor and adapt programme based on developments in context, based on regular (at least six monthly) information from embassies (Kampala re. Rwanda, Nairobi re. Somalia and Kenya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Political disagreements in implementing structures (e.g. EASF, Kenya government and UN) will hamper implementation.</td>
<td>Likely/moderate (High)</td>
<td>Steering committee should monitor (at least biannually) this, based on regular information from embassies and from adviser attached to the organisations and adapt programme accordingly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Donor cooperation and coordination not as developed as in mainstream development assistance.</td>
<td>Possible/moderate (Medium)</td>
<td>Keep close contact to other potential donors. Promote transparency and actively participate in joint donor activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Lack of cohesion of the programme.</td>
<td>Possible/moderate (Medium)</td>
<td>While each of the components and sub-components contribute to the same overall objective, there is no common organisational structure or other mechanism, which ensure cohesion of the programme. The Steering Committee therefore will review the progress of the programme every six months, based on biannual reports provided by the respective implementers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Major Institutional risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. in matrix</th>
<th>Institutional risk</th>
<th>Risk Assessment</th>
<th>Mitigation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fiduciary risks – corruption and misuse of funds.</td>
<td>Unlikely/Major (Medium)</td>
<td>Possibilities for misuse, and misdirection of funds to e.g. Al-Shabaab or similar “spoilers” may have reputational risks. The fund management is in the hands of either Danish Defence Command, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UN, which all have well-known and certified financial procedures, which should mitigate this risk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 13 Process Action Plan

Ref. ToR/PAP
# Annex I: Key indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is developed further and able to contribute to resolving crises in the Wider Horn of Africa and elsewhere.</td>
<td>EASF is able to fully meet the operational requirements envisaged by the AU/ASF and achieves Full Operating Capability in 2015. EASF staff contribution to AMISOM in Somalia is maintained.</td>
<td>EASF attained Initial Operating Capacity in 2009. Key elements are in place – incl. EASFCOM, Planning Element, Brigade HQ &amp; Logistics Base with minimum manning from member states. EASF land component includes military, police &amp; civilian elements. However, operating procedures &amp; concepts require further development. There are also insufficient pledges (esp. police units). EASF providing limited staff officer support to AMISOM (2011).</td>
<td>Results of training exercises; Communiqués &amp; documentation emerging from EASF policy organs; Reporting from Danish advisors; minutes of Friends of EASF grouping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASF is able to declare sufficient RDCs and to deploy and sustain a range of peace support operations.</td>
<td>Rwanda Rapid Deployment Capability (RRDC) provides the third EASF RDC and is assigned with Full Operating Capability in 2015.</td>
<td>EASF (and ASF) overall RDC concept exists. Only limited fact finding and some bilateral planning for RRDC undertaken.</td>
<td>Results of training exercises; Communiqués &amp; documentation emerging from EASF policy organs; Reporting from Danish advisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace support operations in the region are enhanced enabling stabilisation gains to be made.</td>
<td>AMISOM has sufficient funding and support to expand and enhance its control in Somalia in accordance with its mandate.</td>
<td>AMISOM operations confined to Mogadishu. Limited capacity to deploy civilian and police components.</td>
<td>UNSOA and AMISOM reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 2: Piracy prevented and countered at sea and at land, including a more stabilised Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Improved international cooperation concerning counter-piracy through the support of WG2.</strong></td>
<td>An increased number of pirates that are caught are subsequently prosecuted and sentenced.</td>
<td>596 convicted by October 2011.</td>
<td>Reports form WG 2 under the CGPCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved regional cooperation concerning counter-piracy through the support of EASF maritime component.</strong></td>
<td>A regional EASF maritime component for Maritime Peace Support Operations has been established by the end of 2015 and at least one sub-regional combined maritime operation has been conducted.</td>
<td>No existing component and no sub-regional combined operation has been conducted.</td>
<td>Report from EASF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenyan Coast-guard capability strengthened.</strong></td>
<td>Capacity for maintaining MIR engines improved. Survey of surveillance capacity and command and control conducted and capacity improved and Operational cooperation initiated.</td>
<td>No maintenance capacity for MIR engines exist in Kenya. No comprehensive survey of surveillance capacity and Command and Control. No operational cooperation.</td>
<td>Reports from Danish Defence Command and Kenyan Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved rule of law in Somalia with a special emphasis on Puntland.</strong></td>
<td>At least one prison in Somaliland and Puntland respectively established and run according to international standards. Police and judicial system improved their performance. Security in coastal areas improved.</td>
<td>One prison in Somaliland is of acceptable quality and none in Puntland. Other baselines are established in UNDP and UNODC programme documents.</td>
<td>Reports from UNDP and UNODC and from Danish embassy in Nairobi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 3: Regional counterterrorism and anti-radicalisation efforts are increased</td>
<td>Regional control with illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia and counter-terrorism/anti-radicalisation efforts is increased.</td>
<td>With international support, regional states (Ethiopia and Kenya) take concrete action to develop mechanisms (e.g. functioning FIUs) for monitoring and controlling illicit financial flows. Concrete regional cooperation (e.g. MLA) developed to counter terrorism/radical elements.</td>
<td>Major gaps in evidence base. Ethiopia and Kenya have limited institutional capacity to counter illicit financial flows. Both countries criticised by FATF for lack of action and risk blacklisting. Limited regional counter terrorism/radicalisation cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>